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 NOTE 
“A Verdict Worthy of Confidence”: The 
Weakening of Brady’s “Materiality” 
Requirement in Missouri 
State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 S.W.3d 60 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
Robert Wasserman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, Reginald Clemons was convicted and sentenced to death for his 
alleged participation in the brutal rapes and murders of two sisters at the Chain 
of Rocks Bridge in St. Louis, Missouri.  Over twenty years later, and after sev-
eral unsuccessful appeals by Clemons, the Supreme Court of Missouri vacated 
his convictions.  The court found that the prosecution had failed to disclose 
evidence to Clemons’s trial counsel that suggested that he may have given his 
confession involuntarily.  The court concluded that this evidence was suffi-
ciently important that the prosecution’s failure to disclose it undermined con-
fidence in the trial court’s verdict. 
The court therefore held that the prosecution violated Clemons’s due pro-
cess rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland.  How-
ever, Brady and its progeny held that the prosecution’s failure to disclose evi-
dence violates the defendant’s due process rights only where the undisclosed 
evidence is material.  For evidence to be material under Brady, there must be a 
reasonable probability that its disclosure would have changed the outcome of 
the defendant’s trial.  This Note will argue that the court in Clemons errone-
ously applied the Brady doctrine because the undisclosed evidence was imma-
terial.  The result of Clemons’s trial would have been the same even if the trial 
court had suppressed his confession because the State’s evidence was over-
whelming, and it simply did not need Clemons’s confession to convict him.  
Because the allegedly undisclosed evidence was not material under Brady, 
Clemons’s due process rights were not violated, and the court erred in vacating 
his convictions. 
 
* Associate, Bretz & Young LLC.  B.A. Liberal Arts, Thomas More College of Liberal 
Arts, 2013; J.D., University of Missouri School of Law, 2016.  Thanks to Professor 
Ben Trachtenberg for his assistance throughout the writing process and to the editors 
of the Missouri Law Review for their helpful comments and feedback during the editing 
process. 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On the night of April 4, 1991, sisters Julie and Robin Kerry took their 
cousin, Thomas Cummins, to the Chain of Rocks Bridge in St. Louis to see a 
poem they had painted on the bridge several years before.1  As they walked 
east on the bridge, the cousins saw a group of four men approaching them.2  
The four men were at first friendly, and the groups parted without incident.3  
As the cousins continued to walk east toward the Illinois side of the bridge, 
they heard the footsteps of the four men behind them.4  At that point, one of 
the men grabbed Cummins by the arm, walked him away from the group, and 
told him to lie facedown on the ground or be killed.5  The four men then took 
turns brutally raping the Kerry sisters.6  Cummins stated that the men threat-
ened to throw the Kerry sisters off the bridge if they resisted.7 
While the assault was still going on, one of the men, who Cummins would 
later identify as Reginald Clemons, approached Cummins, told him that he had 
just raped his girlfriend, and asked him “how that felt.”8  Cummins replied that 
she was his cousin, not his girlfriend.9  The man identified as Clemons then 
walked Cummins toward an open manhole and instructed him to climb onto 
the platform below, on which the Kerry sisters were already lying down.10  The 
three cousins were then told to step down onto a concrete pier about three feet 
below the platform.11  At this point, Cummins “saw an arm push Julie and then 
Robin off the bridge.”12  One of the men, who Cummins later identified as 
Antonio Richardson, told Cummins to jump from the pier, and he complied.13  
Cummins swam to the surface of the Mississippi river and “briefly had contact 
with Julie” but was unable to see her; he never saw Robin.14 
Cummins somehow swam to the river bank and climbed up to a road at 
around 2:00 a.m.15  He then flagged down a driver and told him “that his cous-
ins had been raped, and that he had been thrown off the bridge.”16  Police later 
arrived and questioned Cummins.17  When it became light outside, the police  
 1. State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 65. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 66. 
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discovered several items that the perpetrators had left on the bridge, including 
“an unused condom, a used condom, a pen, some change, and a cigarette 
butt.”18  They also found a flashlight engraved with “Horn I.”19  Julie’s body 
was found in the river three weeks later near Caruthersville.20  Robin’s body 
was never recovered.21 
Officers took a statement from Cummins at 9:00 a.m., roughly seven 
hours after he had been forced to jump into the river.22  The police became 
skeptical about Cummins’s version of the events, and the investigation began 
to focus on him as the prime suspect.23  The police then took a second statement 
from Cummins, which was largely consistent with his first.24  Nevertheless, an 
“incident report that purportedly summarized Mr. Cummins’ statements in the 
second recorded interrogation[] materially mischaracterized his statements to 
indicate” that he and Julie had been in a romantic relationship, and that he had 
actually never jumped from the bridge but had only gotten wet when he entered 
the river from the bank to search for the sisters.25   
Cummins then agreed to submit to a polygraph test.26  When he was fin-
ished, the polygraph examiner informed Cummins that the test results indicated 
he had been deceptive in his answers.27  Police officers then told Cummins’s 
father that his son’s story did not make sense.28  Cummins’s father responded 
by urging his son to be truthful with the officers.29  The police then interrogated 
Cummins again.30  A police report purporting to summarize Cummins’s state-
ments during that interrogation was prepared.31  The report indicated that Cum-
mins had caused the deaths of the sisters after Julie rejected his sexual ad-
vances.32  Cummins would later testify that after his father had left the interro-
gation room, the interrogating officers screamed at him, threatened him, and 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 65. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 66. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  As set forth more fully below, the police department’s manipulation of 
Cummins’s statements was one of the many incidents of alleged police misconduct in 
the investigation of the Chain of Rocks Murders.  Id. at 66–69. 
 26. Id. at 66. 
 27. Id.  The majority opinion noted that “Cummins’ condition and the circum-
stances under which the polygraph was performed were such that its results should not 
have been given any credence.”  Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 66–67.  The report stated that Cummins had tried to get Julie to have 
sex with him.  Id. at 66.  When she refused, he became angry and shoved her; she then 
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punched the back of his head several times.33  He claimed that despite this co-
ercion, he never made the inculpatory statements that were attributed to him in 
the police report.34  After he was cleared of any wrongdoing in connection with 
the murders, Cummins would receive a $150,000 settlement from the City of 
St. Louis for the abuse he suffered at the hands of the police.35 
About the same time that the authorities charged Cummins with the mur-
ders, they “received a call from a woman who had seen a television news story 
about the search for the owner of a black flashlight.”36  The woman told the 
officers that the flashlight belonged to her family and “had been stolen a few 
days earlier.”37  The information she provided eventually led police to one of 
the men, Antonio Richardson, who, in turn, implicated Clemons and Marlin 
Gray in the murders.38  The police then located Clemons who “voluntarily 
agreed to give a recorded statement.”39  Clemons’s statement was consistent 
with what Cummins had told the police.40 
The police then located Gray, took him into custody, and interrogated 
him.41  His statement also largely corroborated what Cummins had initially told 
police, but he denied that he was in the manhole when the cousins were pushed 
off the bridge.42  While Clemons was in custody, his attorney and family mem-
bers noticed swelling and an abrasion on the right side of his face.43  The judge 
presiding over Clemons’s case ordered that Clemons be medically examined; 
the doctor who performed the examination determined that Clemons had soft 
tissue swelling over the right side of his face.44  Both Clemons and Gray then 
filed complaints with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department Division 
of Internal Affairs.45  They alleged that the officers had beaten them in the 
interrogation room and that they provided their recorded statements only out 
of fear of further abuse.46 
 
lost her balance and fell off the bridge.  Id. at 66–67.  At that point, “he became hyster-
ical and blacked out.”  Id. at 67.  Cummins believed Robin either then jumped into the 
river to rescue her sister or was pushed off the bridge by Cummins.  Id.  The police then 
announced that the murders had been solved and that they had definitively identified 
Cummins as the perpetrator.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 67. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. at 93 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 67 (majority opinion). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 67–68. 
 41. Id. at 68. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 68–69. 
 45. Id. at 69. 
 46. Id. 
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Prior to trial, Clemons moved to suppress the statements he had provided 
to the police on the ground that such statements were the product of police 
coercion and brutality.47  He called several witnesses who testified that they 
had observed swelling on the right side of Clemons’s face following his inter-
rogation.48  The trial court, however, overruled his motion to suppress the con-
fession, claiming that there was no credible evidence demonstrating how 
Clemons had received his injuries, if he did in fact receive them.49 
At Clemons’s trial, the State’s principal evidence consisted of Clem-
mons’s confession, the testimony of Cummins, and the testimony of Daniel 
Winfrey, who had been identified as the fourth perpetrator at the bridge.50  Both 
Cummins and Winfrey testified that Clemons had raped the Kerry sisters, 
robbed Cummins, and had at least acquiesced in the group’s decision to throw 
the cousins from the bridge.51  Clemons “did not testify on his own behalf, but 
he did present witnesses who testified they observed Mr. Clemons’ bruised 
face.”52  Clemons’s attorney was not allowed to argue in his closing statements 
that police had coerced his confession by beating him because the court found 
that there was insufficient evidence to support such a claim.53  The jury found 
him guilty on two counts of first degree murder.54  At the penalty phase of the 
trial, the jury found twelve aggravating circumstances and recommended two 
death sentences.55 
After his trial and sentencing, Clemons filed his first of many motions for 
post-conviction relief.56  These motions principally revolved around his claim 
that his confession should not have been admitted at trial because it was pro-
cured by means of physical force in violation of his due process rights.57  He 
filed a writ of habeas corpus in a U.S. district court; that court denied relief on 
his Fifth Amendment claim but vacated his death sentence on other grounds.58  
 
 47. Id.  See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (holding that “the use 
of the confessions thus obtained [through force is] . . . a clear denial of due process”). 
 48. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 70. 
 49. Id.  In Missouri, “the State has the burden of proving the ‘voluntariness’ of a 
confession.”  State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Mo. 1953).  Further, “when there 
is substantial conflicting evidence and the evidence is close, it is better to refer the issue 
to the jury than to exclude the confession upon the preliminary hearing.”  Id. 
 50. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 67, 70. 
 51. Id. at 70. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 71. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 72. 
 57. Id.  This included a direct appeal and a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme 
Court of Missouri, as well as a writ of habeas corpus to a U.S. district court.  Id. 
 58. See Clemons v. Luebbers, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2002), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 381 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2004).  The district court 
ruled that the trial court had unconstitutionally excluded six people from serving as 
jurors because they expressed discomfort with imposing the death penalty.  Id. at 1107. 
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The Eighth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court’s decision and re-
instated Clemons’s death sentence.59  Clemons then filed a writ of habeas cor-
pus with the Supreme Court of Missouri on the basis of his “actual inno-
cence.”60  The court then appointed a special master to examine the claims 
made in Clemons’s petition in light of the evidence.61 
When Warren Weeks learned of the special master proceeding, he con-
tacted Clemons’s counsel.62  In a videotaped deposition, he testified that he had 
been working as a bail investigator for the Missouri Board of Probation and 
Parole.63  While serving in that role, he was responsible for interviewing pris-
oners and filling out pre-trial release forms, which included, among other 
things, information about the prisoner’s “physical problems.”64  Weeks further 
testified that during his interview of Clemons, he observed a bruise on 
Clemons’s right cheek “between the size of a golf ball and a baseball.”65  He 
testified that he had made a note of this in his pre-trial release form, but that he 
later saw that his notation “had been scratched out and could not be read.”66  
Weeks further testified that he was questioned by police and the prosecutor 
handling Clemons’s case regarding the injuries that Weeks claimed he had ob-
served, and that “he felt pressured not to say anything” about those injuries.67 
In light of Weeks’s testimony, the special master determined that the State 
had willfully suppressed evidence tending to exculpate Clemons in violation 
of Brady.68  The special master further concluded that had Weeks’s testimony 
been revealed, it may have resulted in the suppression of Clemons’s confession 
on the ground that it had not been freely and voluntarily given.69  If the trial 
court had suppressed Clemons’s confession, it may have “put the case in a dif-
ferent light so as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”70  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri affirmed the special master’s findings and recommendation, 
concluding that the State’s Brady violation had substantially prejudiced 
Clemons’s defense and thus undermined the credibility of the verdict.71 
 
 59. Luebbers, 381 F.3d at 757. 
 60. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 72.  In Missouri, “[a]ny person restrained of liberty 
within this state may petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of 
such restraint.”  MO. SUP. CT. R. 91.01(b). 
 61. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 73. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id.  See also Petitioner’s Brief at 8, State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 
S.W.3d 60 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (No. SC90197), 2013 WL 6975162, at *8. 
 64. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 73. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 73–74. 
 67. Id. at 74. 
 68. Id. at 75. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 88. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
For a confession to be admissible at trial, it must be given voluntarily.72  
The Weeks evidence lent support to Clemons’s claim that he had given his 
confession involuntarily.  The Weeks evidence also served as the basis of 
Clemons’s Brady claim.  To understand the court’s decision in Clemons, it is 
necessary that one understand both the voluntariness requirement, as well as 
the requirements set out under Brady.  This section will therefore examine the 
voluntariness requirement and the evolution of the Brady doctrine. 
A.  The Voluntariness Requirement 
In Brown v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court of the United States ad-
dressed the question of “whether convictions, which rest solely upon confes-
sions shown to have been extorted by officers of the state by brutality and vio-
lence, are consistent with the due process of law required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”73  In that case, the de-
fendants confessed to murdering a man only after they were “severely 
whipped” and beaten “with a leather strap with buckles on it.”74  The Court 
noted that in its description of the defendants’ confessions, “the transcript reads 
more like pages torn from some medieval account than a record made within 
the confines of a modern civilization which aspires to an enlightened constitu-
tional government.”75 
The Court held that a State may not substitute “[t]he rack and torture 
chamber . . . for the witness stand.”76  The State may not “contrive[] a convic-
tion resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence.”77  It concluded that 
the State had elicited the defendants’ confessions through methods “revolting 
to the sense of justice,” and that its use of those confessions at trial was there-
fore “a clear denial of due process.”78 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Mississippi, the prohibi-
tion against the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s involuntary confession has 
been a bedrock principle of criminal procedure in America.  In later years, the 
Court would hold that a defendant need not suffer actual violence – “a credible 
threat of physical violence” will suffice to render his confession involuntary.79  
 
 72. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 283 (1936) (“There was thus enough be-
fore the court when these confessions were first offered to make known to the court 
that they were not, beyond all reasonable doubt, free and voluntary; and the failure of 
the court then to exclude the confessions is sufficient to reverse the judgment.”). 
 73. Id. at 279. 
 74. Id. at 281–82. 
 75. Id. at 282. 
 76. Id. at 285–86. 
 77. See id. at 286. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). 
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The Court has also expanded the doctrine by holding that a confession may be 
involuntary if it is procured by means of psychological coercion.80  In short, if 
a trial court finds that the defendant did not give his confession free of physical 
or psychological coercion, actual or threatened, it will not allow the prosecu-
tion to use that evidence at trial, no matter how probative.81  Evidence bearing 
on the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession can theoretically make the 
difference between a guilty or innocent verdict, and its suppression by the pros-
ecution may violate his due process rights under the Supreme Court’s Brady 
jurisprudence. 
B.  Brady and Progeny 
Brady v. Maryland was the first Supreme Court case holding that the pros-
ecution’s failure to disclose material evidence violates a criminal defendant’s 
due process rights.82  In Brady, the petitioner and his companion, Boblit, were 
each found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death.83  Brady ad-
mitted his role in the murder but claimed that it was Boblit who had actually 
killed the victim.84  His counsel admitted that “Brady was guilty of murder in 
the first degree” but requested that the jury not impose the death sentence, as 
he had not actually killed the victim.85  Brady’s counsel requested that he be 
allowed to examine the extrajudicial statements made by his client’s accom-
plice.86  The State turned over several such statements but withheld Boblit’s 
statement in which he admitted that it was he, not Brady, who had committed 
the homicide.87 
When Brady’s attorneys discovered that Boblit’s exculpatory statements 
had been withheld by the prosecution, they moved for a new trial.88  The trial 
court denied the motion, but the court of appeals ruled that the prosecution’s 
suppression of those statements denied Brady due process of law, and it re-
manded the case solely on the issue of his punishment.89  The Supreme Court 
of the United States agreed with the appellate court, holding that “suppression 
of this confession was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”90  The Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of 
 
 80. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). 
 81. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 284 (holding that an involuntary confession admitted 
into trial is sufficient grounds for reversal). 
 82. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  See also Bennett L. Gershman, 
Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 686 (2006) (discussing the 
“landmark decision”). 
 83. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 86.  The Fourteenth Amendment states: 
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evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”91  The Court then held that whether the 
withheld evidence is “material either to guilt or to punishment” depends on 
whether the “evidence[,] . . .  if made available, would tend to exculpate [the 
defendant] or reduce the penalty.”92 
In a later case, the Supreme Court clarified the Brady materiality standard 
and also addressed the question of whether potentially exculpatory material 
needed to be turned over to the defense absent a request.93  In that case, the 
defendant, Agurs, was tried for a murder she allegedly committed while staying 
at a hotel with the victim, Sewell.94  Witnesses stated that they had heard Agurs 
screaming, that they went to her hotel room, and that they discovered Agurs 
struggling underneath Sewell, who was then bleeding from fatal stab wounds 
inflicted by Agurs.95  Agurs argued at trial that Sewell had attacked her, and 
that she had stabbed him in self-defense.96  She was convicted.97  Three months 
later, her attorneys discovered that Sewell had a criminal record indicating a 
violent character, and that the State had possessed this record during trial but 
failed to disclose it to the defense.98  Agurs then moved for a new trial.99 
The Court held that “there are situations in which evidence is obviously 
of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to 
be disclosed even without a specific request.”100  The Court then held that the 
standard of materiality with respect to Brady disclosures must reflect the de-
gree to which the failure to disclose casts doubt on the validity of the convic-
tion.101  It stated that “if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that 
did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed.”102 
 
 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 91. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 92. Id. at 87–88; see also JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PERSPECTIVES 884 (4th ed. 2009). 
 93. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98–99, 107 (1976). 
 94. Id. at 99. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 100. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 110. 
 101. See id. at 112. 
 102. Id. 
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In United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether impeachment evidence, as distinguished from exculpatory evidence, 
must be disclosed under Brady.103  The defendant, Bagley, was indicted in fed-
eral court on weapons and drug charges.104  Before his trial, Bagley had re-
quested that the prosecutors handling his case turn over the names and ad-
dresses of the witnesses they intended to call, as well as any deals or induce-
ments that had been promised to the witnesses in exchange for their testi-
mony.105  The government responded by providing the names of its two prin-
cipal witnesses who had been assisting in an undercover investigation of Bag-
ley on behalf of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.106  
The information produced, however, did not include any deals that the govern-
ment had struck with the two witnesses.107  The government disclosed no such 
deals.108 
Bagley was subsequently found guilty of the narcotics charges and not 
guilty of the weapons charges.109  After his trial, Bagley submitted a request 
for documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act regarding the agree-
ments that the government had entered into with its principal witnesses in Bag-
ley’s case.110  Those documents revealed that the witnesses had been compen-
sated for their testimony.111  Bagley then moved to vacate his convictions, ar-
guing that the government’s failure to disclose its witnesses’ compensation 
prevented him from impeaching their testimony and thereby denied him a fair 
trial.112 
The Supreme Court first noted that there is no distinction between im-
peachment evidence and exculpatory evidence in the context of alleged Brady 
violations.113  It then clarified the materiality standard for non-disclosed evi-
 
 103. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669 (1985). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 669–70. 
 106. Id. at 670. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. at 671. 
 110. Id.  The pertinent rule states:  
 
An inmate may make a request for access to documents in his or her Inmate 
Central File or Medical File (including documents which have been with-
held from disclosure during the inmate’s review of his or her Inmate Central 
File pursuant to § 513.40) and/or other documents concerning the inmate 
which are not contained in the Inmate Central File or Medical File.  Staff 
shall process such a request pursuant to the applicable provisions of the 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. 
 
28 C.F.R. § 513.61 (2017). 
 111. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 671. 
 112. Id. at 671–72. 
 113. Id. at 676. 
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dence as follows: “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable prob-
ability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A ‘reasonable probability’ is a proba-
bility sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”114  Accordingly, the 
Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the suppressed evi-
dence would have, with reasonable probability, affected the trial court’s ver-
dict.115 
In what Professor Joshua Dressler called the “most recent pronouncement 
on the discovery issue,”116 the defendant in Smith v. Cain was charged with 
murdering five people during an armed robbery.117  At his trial, a single witness 
identified Smith as the perpetrator.118  Smith was subsequently convicted on 
five counts of first degree murder.119  Smith then moved to vacate his convic-
tions on the ground that the State had failed to disclose that its sole eyewitness 
had made statements indicating strong uncertainty about whether he could re-
member the perpetrator or identify him if he saw him again.120 
The Court began its analysis by reiterating the materiality standard set 
forth in Bagley.121  That is, non-disclosed evidence is material if there is a rea-
sonable probability that its use by the defendant at trial may have altered the 
trial’s outcome.122  A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant 
“‘would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evi-
dence,’ [it means] only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough 
to ‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”123  The Court further 
held that “evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s 
other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.”124  It did 
find, however, that the suppressed evidence in this case was sufficiently strong 
to undermine confidence in the verdict.125 
 
 114. Id. at 682. 
 115. Id. at 684.  On remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the State’s failure to disclose the impeachment evidence “unconstitutionally 
interfered with Bagley’s right to a fair trial.”  Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1302 
(9th Cir. 1986). 
 116. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 92, at 901.  Professor Dressler is the Frank 
R. Strong Chair in Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and “is 
one of the country’s most respected authorities on the subjects of criminal law and 
criminal procedure.”  Professors: Joshua Dressler, OHIO ST. UNIV. MORITZ C. OF L., 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/professor/joshua-dressler/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
 117. Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2012). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 629–30. 
 121. See id. at 630. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 
(1995)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 631. 
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IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri vacated Clemons’s con-
victions.126  The court held that his claim for habeas relief could proceed under 
the “cause and prejudice” exception and thus his due process rights had been 
violated.127  The court emphasized that this was the conclusion reached by the 
special master, and that it was “supported by substantial evidence and [did] not 
erroneously declare or apply the law.”128  The dissent strongly disagreed, argu-
ing that Clemons’s habeas claim was procedurally barred and that the special 
master’s recommendation and the majority’s ruling were based on a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding of the Brady doctrine.129 
A.  Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court of Missouri began its analysis of Clemons’s claim for 
habeas relief by noting that such relief is usually not available for a claim that 
could have been raised “on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding.”130  
Therefore, the court had to determine whether an exception to the procedural 
bar existed in this case before it could proceed to its substantive Brady analy-
sis.131  Whether such an exception existed in this case depended on whether 
“the procedural defect was caused by something external to the defense – that 
is, a cause for which the defense is not responsible – and [] prejudice resulted 
from the underlying error that worked to the petitioner’s actual and substantial 
disadvantage.”132  The “cause and prejudice” exception would require Clemons 
to demonstrate that an external cause prevented him from presenting this evi-
dence at trial and that he was prejudiced thereby.133  Under this standard, the 
basis for the claim “must not have been reasonably available to [the defense]”; 
“[e]vidence that has been deliberately concealed by the state is not reasonably 
available . . . .”134  The court ruled that, as Weeks’s report had been altered and 
withheld from the defense, that evidence was not reasonably available, and thus 
Clemons had carried his burden with respect to the “cause” prong of the ex-
ception.135  Next, the court considered whether withholding the evidence had 
 
 126. State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 S.W.3d 60, 88–89 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 127. Id. at 88. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 89 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 76 (majority opinion). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510, 516–17 (Mo. 2010) 
(en banc)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 76–77. 
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prejudiced Clemons’s defense under the second prong.136  The court deter-
mined that if Clemons could demonstrate that the State’s withholding Weeks’s 
report had prejudiced him under Brady, he would have met both prongs of the 
“cause and prejudice” exception to the procedural bar to habeas relief.137 
The court reiterated that a successful Brady claim actually consists of 
three elements: (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant’s case because it 
either is exculpatory or impeaches a prosecution witness, (2) the evidence was 
withheld by the police or prosecution, and (3) the defendant was prejudiced by 
the suppression in either the guilt or punishment phase of trial.138  The court 
then cautioned that the defendant need not show that disclosure of the evidence 
would have ultimately resulted in acquittal in order to demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced by its suppression.139 
The court first considered whether the evidence was favorable to 
Clemons’s defense under the first Brady prong.140  It noted that the special 
master had found that Weeks’s report or testimony would have been favorable 
to Clemons’s defense, and that the special master’s conclusions were entitled 
to significant deference.141  The court noted that while several witnesses had 
testified that they observed swelling on Clemons’s face, the majority of those 
witnesses had observed Clemons at least forty-eight hours after the interroga-
tion.142  Thus, while they could attest to the existence of his injuries, their tes-
timony left great uncertainty regarding who inflicted those injuries.143  On the 
other hand, Weeks had met with Clemons only a few hours after he was 
booked, making his testimony regarding Clemons’s injuries substantially better 
support for Clemons’s claims that the interrogating officers had beaten him.144  
Moreover, if Weeks had been allowed to testify, he would have been the only 
witness without a familial or personal connection to Clemons to describe the 
injuries.145 
Furthermore, the court held that if Clemons had been able to rely on 
Weeks’s observations at the suppression hearing, the trial court may have been 
 
 136. Id. at 78. 
 137. Id. at 77. 
 138. Id. at 78 (citing State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 338 (Mo. 
2013) (en banc)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 78, 80.  The Supreme Court of Missouri has explained that a special 
“master’s findings, conclusions and recommendations . . . [are] accord[ed] the weight 
and deference given to trial courts in court-tried cases, in light of the master’s oppor-
tunity to view and judge the credibility of witnesses.”  State ex rel. Busch by Whitson 
v. Busch, 776 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Mo. 1989) (en banc). 
 142. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 79. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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more likely to exclude the confession as involuntary.146  While Clemons’s con-
fession was certainly not the only evidence that the State presented at his trial, 
“‘[a] confession is like no other evidence’ because it ‘is probably the most pro-
bative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against [a defendant].’”147  
At the very least, the court held, Weeks’s report or testimony could have made 
the difference between a life sentence and a death sentence.148  The court con-
cluded, therefore, that Clemons had met his burden under the first Brady 
prong.149 
The court then proceeded to the second Brady prong and affirmed the 
special master’s conclusion that the State had failed to produce the favorable 
Weeks evidence.150  Specifically, the court noted the special master’s findings 
that Weeks’s notation had been crossed out and his belief that it had been done 
by “someone . . . on behalf of the state.”151  It referred further to the special 
master’s finding that the State had attempted to persuade Weeks to remain si-
lent about his observation of Clemons’s injuries.152  In light of all of this evi-
dence, and considering that the special master’s factual findings are entitled to 
significant deference, the court concluded that the second Brady prong had 
been satisfied as well.153 
Finally, the court considered whether the State’s suppression of the 
Weeks evidence had prejudiced Clemons.154  It began its inquiry by observing 
that the special master found this prong to be satisfied.155  Weeks interviewed 
Clemons fewer than three hours after the interrogation in which Clemons al-
leged he was beaten.156  Because of Weeks’s “close proximity” to the alleged 
beating, and because he was a completely impartial witness, the court con-
cluded that either his report or his testimony would have cast doubt on the vol-
untariness of Weeks’s confession.157  The court then called attention to the 
unique and highly probative value of a confession in a criminal proceeding.158  
Since Weeks’s report or testimony quite possibly could have resulted in 
 
 146. See id. at 80.  See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960) (noting 
“that the Fourteenth Amendment is grievously breached when an involuntary confes-
sion is obtained by state officers and introduced into evidence in a criminal prosecution 
which culminates in a conviction”). 
 147. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 80–81 (alterations in original) (quoting Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991)). 
 148. Id. at 81. 
 149. Id. at 82. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 83. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. at 84. 
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Clemons’s confession being suppressed, the court held that Clemons had suf-
fered substantial prejudice by its non-disclosure.159  Therefore, confidence in 
the verdict had been undermined.160 
In its conclusion, the court once again referred to the special master’s re-
port.161  The special master found that the State had suppressed critical evi-
dence and that this suppression sufficiently prejudiced Clemons’s defense to 
undermine confidence in his guilty verdicts.162  The court held that these find-
ings were “supported by substantial evidence and [did] not erroneously declare 
or apply the law.”163  Consequently, the court “adopt[ed] the master’s recom-
mendation, and vacat[ed] Mr. Clemons’ convictions.”164 
B.  Judge Wilson’s Dissent 
Judge Paul Wilson took issue with the special master’s conclusion that 
disclosure of the Weeks evidence “may have resulted” in a different verdict.  
He argued that vacating a defendant’s convictions is only appropriate under 
Brady if there is a reasonable probability that disclosure “would have” resulted 
in a different verdict.165  Furthermore, the dissent pointed to language in the 
report indicating the special master’s skepticism that disclosure of the Weeks 
evidence would have affected the outcome of the case considering the strength 
of the State’s other inculpatory evidence.166  He stated that Brady does not re-
quire reversal of the defendant’s convictions “when the case against the de-
fendant remains overwhelming, even when viewed in light of the undisclosed 
evidence.”167  The dissent argued that the special master had misapplied Brady 
and its progeny.168  The special master found it reasonably probable that dis-
closure of the Weeks evidence would have resulted in suppression of 
Clemons’s confession and argued that this alone warranted reversal of his con-
victions.169  The special master did not, the dissent contended, base his decision 
on a reasonable probability that disclosure of the Weeks evidence would have 
affected the outcome of Clemons’s case.170  Because Judge Wilson believed 
that the special master had misapplied the law, he argued that the appropriate 
 
 159. Id. at 84–85. 
 160. Id. at 85. 
 161. Id. at 88. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 90 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 
(1999)). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. (“It is enough if there is a reasonable probability of a different result. . 
. . I believe Clemons has satisfied that standard.”). 
 170. Id. 
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remedy was to remand the case to the special master to address that question, 
rather than to vacate Clemons’s convictions.171 
The dissent then argued that the suppression of the Weeks evidence did 
not satisfy the “cause and prejudice” test necessary to overcome the procedural 
bar to Clemons’s claim for habeas relief.172  As stated above, in order to show 
cause under this exception, the defendant must demonstrate that the allegedly 
suppressed evidence was not reasonably available to the defense.173  The dis-
sent argued that Clemons could not carry his burden under this prong because 
Weeks had mentioned the swelling on Clemons’s face during their inter-
view.174  Thus, Clemons knew that Weeks could testify concerning his injuries 
and thereby corroborate his claim that the police extracted his confession by 
means of physical abuse.175  As the “prejudice” element for habeas relief 
(within the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim) is identical to 
the materiality determination under Brady, the dissent found that even if 
Clemons could show that the Weeks evidence was unavailable to him, he still 
would not be able to demonstrate that prejudice.176 
The dissent expressed strong skepticism that the Weeks evidence would 
have resulted in suppression of Clemons’s confession.177  But even if it would 
have, the dissent argued, that failure alone would not have sufficiently preju-
diced Clemons’s case to allow him to overcome the procedural bar to his ha-
beas claim.178  This is because the State’s other evidence was so overwhelming 
that it simply did not need Clemons’s confession to procure his conviction.179  
Judge Wilson concluded that even if the admission of Clemons’s confession at 
trial was error, such error was immaterial because even without the confession, 
the State’s other evidence was strong enough to support Clemons’s convictions  
 171. Id. at 91. 
 172. See id. at 104.  The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that habeas relief is 
“the last judicial inquiry into the validity of a criminal conviction.”  State ex rel. Wood-
worth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (quoting State ex rel. 
Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)), modified (Jan. 29, 
2013).  It is not, however, “a substitute for post-conviction relief claims cognizable on 
direct appeal or in Rule 29.15 motions.”  Id.  Thus, to proceed with a habeas claim that 
should have been raised on direct appeal, the defendant must demonstrate the presence 
of an extraordinary circumstance, such as his “actual innocence” or (as in this case) that 
he has satisfied the requirements for the “cause and prejudice” exception.  Id. 
 173. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 104 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 104–06.  Judge Wilson essentially argued that since Clemons knew who 
Weeks was, and he knew that Weeks had noticed his injuries, Clemons’s counsel could 
have presumably located Weeks and his report through reasonable diligence.  Id. at 
105–06.  Thus, the Weeks evidence was practically available to Clemons and his coun-
sel before and during his trial, and the evidence was therefore not “undisclosed” under 
Brady.  See id. at 104. 
 176. Id. at 107–08. 
 177. See id. at 108–13. 
 178. See id. at 113, 122. 
 179. Id. at 119–20. 
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and sentences.180  Specifically, the dissent argued that the most damning evi-
dence against Clemons consisted of the testimony provided by Cummins 
(Clemons’s alleged victim) and Winfrey (Clemons’s alleged accomplice).181  
Judge Wilson opined that the testimony of those witnesses, and not Clemons’s 
confession, constituted the “lynchpin” of the State’s case against Clemons.182  
In light of what it deemed to be overwhelming evidence against Clemons, the 
dissent therefore declared that “Clemons should not be given relief because 
there is no reasonable probability that – without Clemons’ statement – the jury 
would not have convicted him or sentenced him to death.”183 
V.  COMMENT 
The majority’s decision in Clemons is flawed in a number of respects.  
The court held that the State had failed to disclose the Weeks evidence,184 but 
it was undisputed that Weeks’s report and testimony were readily available to 
Clemons and his attorneys because Weeks asked Clemons personally about the 
swelling on his face while he was preparing his report.185  The court held that 
the State’s failure to disclose Weeks’s report had prejudiced Clemons under 
Brady,186 but this holding is unsupportable.  While it is certainly true that 
Clemons may have been able to convince the trial judge to exclude his confes-
sion had he presented the Weeks evidence at his suppression hearing, that pos-
sibility is not sufficient to warrant vacating his sentences.  Rather, vacatur is 
only warranted under Brady where “nondisclosure was so serious that there is 
a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a 
different verdict” or a different sentence.187  No such reasonable probability 
existed in Clemons’s case because, as the special master himself suggested, the 
strength of the State’s other evidence remained overwhelming, even absent 
Clemons’s confession.  Furthermore, the Clemons majority erred in adopting 
the special master’s recommendation after concluding that it did not “errone-
ously declare or apply the law.”188  To the contrary, as the dissent persuasively 
argued, the special master’s recommendation was premised on a fundamental 
misapplication of the Brady doctrine. 
 
 180. Id.  Judge Wilson is essentially making a harmless error argument – the undis-
closed evidence was not “material” under Brady, and therefore the State’s failure to 
disclose it is “harmless” because Clemons suffered no prejudice through its suppres-
sion.  See id. at 122–23.  According to Judge Wilson, vacatur of Clemons’s convictions 
or sentences was therefore not warranted under the harmless error doctrine.  See id. 
 181. Id. at 117–19. 
 182. Id. at 119. 
 183. Id. at 123. 
 184. Id. at 82 (majority opinion). 
 185. Id. at 105–06 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 186. Id. at 88 (majority opinion). 
 187. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). 
 188. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 86. 
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A.  Brady and Prosecutorial or Police Misconduct 
As mentioned above, the investigation of the Chain of Rocks murders 
produced multiple allegations of police misconduct.  Clemons and Gray both 
alleged that police had extorted their inculpatory statements through intimida-
tion and physical abuse.189  Cummins, who was cleared of any wrongdoing, 
similarly complained that police had beaten him in the interrogation room.190  
The police further “mischaracterized” Cummins’s statements in an obvious ef-
fort to inculpate him.191  Finally, Weeks alleged that the police had altered the 
notation he had made in his pretrial release form regarding Clemons’s injury, 
and that even the prosecutor had pressured him to keep quiet about his obser-
vations.192  In short, Weeks put it very mildly when he commented that “there[ 
was] something weird going on” in the investigation of the Chain of Rocks 
murders.193 
It is important to note at the outset that, despite these instances of flagrant 
police and prosecutorial misconduct, Clemons must still demonstrate that he 
suffered Brady prejudice to justify vacating his sentences.  The Brady Court 
made clear that the doctrine is not a tool for punishing and deterring police and 
prosecutorial misconduct.194  Rather, the Brady analysis is the same, “irrespec-
tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”195  Its primary purpose 
is the “avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.”196  Under Brady, the de-
fendant has only endured an unfair trial in violation of his due process rights 
where the undisclosed evidence is “material either to guilt or to punishment.”197 
B.  Brady’s Applicability in Suppression Hearings 
The dissent assumed for the sake of argument that Brady applies to sup-
pression hearings.198  But the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue 
squarely.  While the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on this issue, the 
lower courts have generally found that the Brady analysis should apply where 
the undisclosed evidence could potentially have altered the result of a defend-
ant’s motion to suppress.199  But as the dissent argued, even if Brady does apply  
 189. Id. at 69. 
 190. Id. at 67.  See also id. at 93 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (detailing the settlement 
paid to Cummins by the City of St. Louis for allegations of assault by police officers 
with the intent of obtaining a false confession). 
 191. Id. at 66 (majority opinion). 
 192. Id. at 74–75. 
 193. Id. at 75. 
 194. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 107 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 199. See Biles v. United States, 101 A.3d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding 
“that the suppression of material information can violate due process under Brady if it 
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where the undisclosed evidence allegedly would have been favorable to an ac-
cused on his motion to suppress, the defendant must satisfy a two-prong test to 
procure a reversal of his convictions – “the inmate must show both: (1) a rea-
sonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would have altered the out-
come of the suppression hearing; and (2) a reasonable probability that the sup-
pression of the evidence would have altered the outcome of the trial on the 
question of guilt or punishment.”200 
The dissent argued that neither prong had been satisfied.201  Judge Wilson 
reasoned that “there is no reasonable probability that the disclosure of Weeks’ 
evidence would have changed this ruling because the trial court made its deci-
sion on the basis of the officers’ and Clemons’ credibility, not on the strength 
(or weakness) of the corroborating witnesses . . . . Weeks’ evidence sheds no 
light on this . . . .”202  This argument does not seem particularly compelling.  
The trial judge at Clemons’s suppression hearing denied his pretrial motion 
because Clemons presented “no ‘credible evidence to show how he got [his] 
injuries if, in fact, he got them.’”203  As the majority opinion notes, Weeks’s 
report and testimony would have made Clemons’s claim of police brutality 
substantially more credible.204  The special master found that Weeks had inter-
viewed Clemons “less than three hours” after Clemons alleged that he was 
beaten by the officers.205  Furthermore, had Weeks testified at the suppression 
hearing, he would have been the only witness to corroborate Clemons’s claim 
who had no connection to Clemons and therefore no motive “to fabricate his 
observations.”206 
It is, of course, possible that the judge still would have denied Clemons’s 
motion to suppress his own confession.  However, Weeks, an entirely disinter-
ested witness, could have testified that he observed a large bump on Clemons’s 
face very shortly after Clemons alleged he was beaten.  Weeks’s report or tes-
timony thus would have provided exactly the sort of credible evidence that the 
judge found was lacking when he denied Clemons’s motion to suppress.  The 
dissent’s argument that there was no reasonable probability that the Weeks ev-
idence would have affected the outcome of the suppression hearing is therefore 
unpersuasive. 
 
affects the success of a defendant’s pretrial suppression motion”); United States v. 
Gamez-Orduño, 235 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The suppression of material evi-
dence helpful to the accused, whether at trial or on a motion to suppress, violates due 
process if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”). 
 200. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 107 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (citing McNary v. Lemke, 
708 F.3d 905, 916–17 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
 201. Id. at 108. 
 202. Id. at 109. 
 203. Id. (alteration in original). 
 204. Id. at 82 (majority opinion). 
 205. Id. at 79. 
 206. Id. 
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C.  The Weeks Evidence Would Not Have Altered the Outcome of 
Clemons’s Trial 
As mentioned, three requirements must be met to justify overturning a 
defendant’s convictions on Brady grounds: “The evidence at issue must be fa-
vorable to the accused . . . ; that evidence must have been suppressed by the 
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”207  
While there is some question about whether disclosure of the Weeks evidence 
would have altered the result of the suppression hearing, it seems even less 
likely that it would or should have affected the outcome of his trial.  This ap-
pears to be the dissent’s primary argument.208  Indeed, despite recommending 
that Clemons’s convictions be overturned, the special master himself expressed 
serious doubts about whether suppression of his inculpatory statements would 
have affected the jury’s verdict.209 
A Brady violation only warrants vacatur of the defendant’s convictions 
or sentences where the violation “undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
[defendant’s] trial.”210  Thus, even a serious Brady violation will not require 
vacatur if the State’s other evidence is sufficiently strong to sustain the defend-
ant’s convictions and sentences.211  As the majority asserted, “[A] confession 
is like no other evidence” because it “is probably the most probative and dam-
aging evidence that can be admitted against [a defendant].”212  Furthermore: 
In our criminal justice system as it has developed, suppression hearings 
often are as important as the trial which may follow.  The government’s 
case may turn upon the confession or other evidence that the defendant 
seeks to suppress, and the trial court’s ruling on such evidence may 
determine the outcome of the case.213 
But the State’s evidence against Clemons was not limited to his confes-
sion.  The other inculpatory evidence was sufficiently strong that it seems 
highly doubtful that Clemons was prejudiced within the meaning of Brady, 
even if the Weeks evidence would have caused the trial court to suppress his 
confession.  Specifically, as the dissent argued, the true lynchpin of the case 
 
 207. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 
 208. See Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 120–23 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. at 122 (“I am dubious that the suppression of Clemons’ statement would 
have made much difference in this case, due to the strength of the evidence against 
him.”). 
 210. Id. at 83 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
678 (1985)). 
 211. See id. at 91 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 212. Id. at 80–81 (majority opinion) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
296 (1991)). 
 213. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397 n.1 (1979) (emphasis added). 
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against Clemons was the testimony provided by the two eyewitnesses – Cum-
mins and Winfrey.214 
Both witnesses testified, saying that Clemons had raped the Kerry sisters, 
that he had encouraged others in the group to rape the Kerry sisters, that he 
had, at the very least, been complicit in shoving the cousins off the bridge, and 
that he had later bragged about the crime.215  Clemons’s audiotaped confession 
merely reiterated the testimonies of Cummins and Gray.216  The majority 
stressed that “Clemons’ confession [was] the only direct evidence placing 
[him] on the platform” where the Kerry sisters were shoved into the river.217  
But as the dissent made clear, the State did not need that evidentiary fact in 
order to convict Clemons of first degree murder under the law of accomplice 
liability.218  In fact, Marlin Gray, one of the four alleged perpetrators, was con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death, even though he was not on the bridge 
when the cousins were shoved into the river.219 
As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can demonstrate a Brady vi-
olation sufficient to overturn his conviction or sentence “by showing that the 
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”220  Thus, although 
the State failed to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, this is not a suf-
ficient reason to vacate his conviction or sentence.  As the dissent argued, even 
without his own audiotaped confession, the evidence against Clemons re-
mained overwhelming.221  The special master himself expressed serious doubt 
that suppression of Clemons’s confession would have affected the jury’s ver-
dicts at all.222  Thus, there was no reasonable probability that Clemons’s trial 
would have resulted in a different result if his confession had been suppressed.  
Even if Clemons’s confession were involuntary and thus improperly admitted 
at trial, the State’s other evidence was sufficiently strong that its erroneous ad-
mission could not reasonably “undermine confidence in the outcome” of his 
trial.223 
 
 214. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 119 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 215. Id. at 120–23. 
 216. Compare id. at 67–68 (majority opinion) (summarizing Clemons’s audiotaped 
confession), with id. at 118–19 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (summarizing the testimony of 
Cummins and Winfrey). 
 217. Id. at 85 (majority opinion). 
 218. See id. at 121 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). 
 221. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 123 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 222. Id. 
 223. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
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D.  The Weeks Evidence Was Known to Clemons 
As both the majority and dissent discussed, Clemons was required to 
show “cause and prejudice” to justify bringing his belated Brady claim.224  As 
set forth above, the cause element “requires ‘a showing that the factual or legal 
basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel or that some interfer-
ence by officials made compliance impracticable.’”225  But as the dissent illus-
trates, the Weeks evidence was reasonably available to Clemons.  Weeks’s 
name was disclosed to Clemons’s defense counsel.226  But most importantly, 
Clemons himself knew of Weeks’s existence and knew that Weeks could have 
provided him with favorable testimony.227  This is because Weeks interviewed 
Clemons personally, noticed the swelling on Clemons’s face, and “mentioned 
the apparent swelling to Clemons when the two were sitting face-to-face that 
morning of April 8, 1991.”228  The Weeks evidence was thus more than “rea-
sonably available to” Clemons’s counsel; it was known by Clemons himself.229  
Because Clemons could not show cause as to why he did not bring his Brady 
claim sooner, he should not have been allowed to circumvent the procedural 
bar to his claim for habeas relief. 
Furthermore, even if Clemons’s habeas claim were not procedurally 
barred, the Weeks evidence was still available to him and his counsel, which is 
fatal to his Brady claim.  Federal courts have held that “[t]he rule of Brady is 
limited to the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to 
the prosecution but unknown to the defense.”230  It therefore does not apply 
where, as here, the defendant was fully aware of the favorable evidence.  
Clemons’s Brady claim should have failed for the same reason that his “cause 
and prejudice” claim should have failed – he knew that Weeks had observed a 
bruise on his face shortly after his interrogation because Weeks specifically 
asked him about the bruise during their interview.  For that reason, Clemons 
should not have been able to “profit [] from information that he knew about 
long before trial and that his lawyers could have pursued (but did not pursue) 
more than 20 years ago.”231 
 
 224. See Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 76; id. at 93 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 225. Id. at 104 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 
488 (1986)). 
 226. Id. at 105. 
 227. See id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. at 94, 105–06. 
 230. See, e.g., Nassar v. Sissel, 792 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) 
(citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). 
 231. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 105 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
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E.  The Special Master Misapplied the Brady Doctrine 
Perhaps most importantly, the dissent argued that the special master’s rec-
ommendation was erroneous because he had apparently misunderstood the law 
set forth by Brady and its progeny.232  First, the special master concluded that, 
had Clemons made use of the evidence at the pretrial hearing, Weeks’s report 
or testimony “may have resulted” in the trial court suppressing his confes-
sion.233  As the dissent contends, “This is insufficient.”234  As set forth above, 
if the Brady analysis applies to suppression hearings, the defendant must show 
both a reasonable probability that the result of the suppression hearing would 
have been different and a reasonable probability that the result of the trial 
would have been different.235  That the result of the suppression hearing “may 
have been different” does not warrant reversal of the defendant’s convic-
tions.236  In Agurs, the Court rejected the idea that prejudice is shown by “[t]he 
mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the 
defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial.”237 
Additionally, as the dissent pointed out, the special master did not find it 
reasonably probable that the result of the trial would have been different had 
the trial judge suppressed Clemons’s confession.238  In fact, the special master 
declined to address this question altogether.239  The special master stated in his 
report: 
The state has suggested that harmless error would protect the jury ver-
dict, even if Clemons’ confession had been suppressed.  It seems to me 
that the State’s argument is contrary to Kyles v. Whitley[,] . . . where the 
Supreme Court held that once a violation of Brady and its progeny is 
shown, “there is no need for further harmless-error review.”240 
The dissent argued persuasively that the special master’s application of 
Kyles reflected a crucial misunderstanding of that case.241  The special master’s 
conclusion suggests that where evidence favorable to the accused has been sup-
pressed, the reviewing court’s inquiry is complete.242  It must reverse the de-
fendant’s convictions without examining whether the undisclosed evidence 
would have affected the outcome of the proceeding.243  But as the dissent made 
 
 232. Id. at 91, 113. 
 233. Id. at 90. 
 234. Id. (citing Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999)). 
 235. See id. at 89. 
 236. See id. at 90. 
 237. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109–10 (1976). 
 238. See Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 90 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 239. Id. at 90, 113. 
 240. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). 
 241. Id. at 91, 113. 
 242. Id. at 90. 
 243. See id. 
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clear, “Kyles is not the roadblock to common sense that the Master thought (or 
was told) it is.”244  Kyles does not prohibit the reviewing court from determin-
ing what effect, if any, the undisclosed evidence would have had on the jury’s 
verdicts – “[t]hat is the opposite of what Kyles holds.”245  Kyles affirmed the 
Court’s prior Brady jurisprudence by holding that a Brady violation only oc-
curs where the absence of the withheld evidence had a “substantial and injuri-
ous effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”246  This requirement 
necessarily contemplates that reviewing courts will have to determine what im-
pact admission of the undisclosed evidence would have had on the jury’s deci-
sion in light of the State’s other evidence. 
The special master’s misunderstanding of Kyles prevented him from bas-
ing his recommendation on the probable impact that omission of the Weeks 
evidence had on the outcome of Clemons’s trial.  But had he thought himself 
free to answer this question, he strongly suggested that his conclusion would 
have been the same as the dissent’s.  That is, the prosecution’s alleged non-
disclosure of the Weeks evidence was “harmless” due to the overwhelming 
strength of the State’s other evidence.  Because the special master’s recom-
mendation was based on a clear misconstruction of the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Kyles, the court should not have ordered that Clemons receive a new 
trial.  Rather, it should have sent the case back to the special master with in-
structions that he determine whether Clemons actually suffered Brady preju-
dice through non-disclosure of the Weeks evidence. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As Judge Wilson stated in the conclusion of his dissent, we “do not know 
whether Clemons was beaten to compel him to give” his confession.247  
Weeks’s report and statements, coupled with Cummins’s and Gray’s substan-
tially similar allegations, seem to provide strong support for Clemons’s claim.  
But Brady and its progeny make clear that gross misconduct by agents of the 
State does not justify vacatur of a criminal defendant’s convictions.  That dras-
tic remedy is only available where the undisclosed evidence was so significant 
that the State’s suppression resulted in a verdict unworthy of confidence.  Here, 
the State’s “suppression” of the Weeks evidence did not produce that result.  
Even without his confession, the State’s evidence was more than sufficient to 
sustain his convictions and sentences.  The court’s decision in Clemons reflects 
a crucial misunderstanding of the Brady doctrine.  It presents a dangerously 
 
 244. Id. at 113. 
 245. See id. at 114. 
 246. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (quoting Kotteakos v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 
(1999) (stating “there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so 
serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have 
produced a different verdict”). 
 247. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 123 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
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watered down version of Brady’s “materiality” requirement.  It allows criminal 
defendants whose convictions are supported by overwhelming evidence to suc-
ceed in having those convictions overturned.  Clemons sets a dangerous prec-
edent in Missouri – one that the Supreme Court of the United States has con-
demned over and over again through its Brady jurisprudence. 
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